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Abstract
Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993) considered a single, homogeneous population of agents
playing a 2-player 2-action, coordination game and found that the risk-dominant equilibrium
is the stochastically stable outcome. However, this robustness does not extend to the case where
there are distinct populations of player 1’s and player 2’s. Here, with some restrictions on the
adjustment dynamics other than the ‘Darwinian property’ we show that the risk-dominant
equilibrium would be the stochastically stable outcome in the “battle of the sexes” game.
Key words: Evolutionary games; Heterogeneous population; Risk dominance
JEL Classﬁcation: C72, D83
There is some literature on the stochastically stable equilibria in games with best response
learning when the players experiment randomly. Kandori,Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young
(1993) are two well-known studies on this topic.
In particular, Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993) showed that the risk-dominant equilib-
rium is the long run equilibrium in a 2-player, 2-action coordination game with a single
homogeneous population, provided that a very weak assumption, named the ‘Darwinian
property’, is satisﬁed. The coordination game they considered is an important one with many
implications in the real world. However, it is by no means the only game to which their concept
of the long run equilibrium can be applied. The unfortunate fact is that beyond the 2-player,
2-action coordination game with a single homogeneous population, the ‘Darwinian property’
is not strong enough to ﬁnd out which state will be the long run equilibrium in general.
In this paper we will look at coordination games similar to those of Kandori,Mailath, and
Rob (1993), except for the fact that there are two populations of players instead of one
homogeneous population. We will assume that the players are playing games only with players
from the other population. We can observe this kind of situation in the real world, such as the
case of sellers and buyers in the retail market or the case of males and females when they
interact with each other.
 I thank Drew Fudenberg for bringing my interest into this area and encouraging me throughout. I also thank
Tomas Sjo ¨ stro ¨ m, Gadi Barlevy, and the editor and the referee for their very kind advice and comments. Financial
aid from Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies is gratefully acknowledged.
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 44 (2003), pp.23-35.  Hitotsubashi UniversityThese games with two populations of players were mentioned brieﬂy in the last section of
Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993), and they gave one example to show the di$culties in
analyzing the two-population case compared with the one homogeneous population case. Here,
we will look more systematically at the di#erences between single- and two-population cases.
In this paper we will mainly concentrate on ‘battle of the sexes’ games, as shown below.
In other words, games such that while coordination is always desired by both populations of
players, each prefers a di#erent coordination equilibrium because their payo#s are asymmetric.
The main result of this paper shows us what conditions are needed for the adjustment
dynamics of the ‘risk-dominant equilibrium’ to be the long run equilibrium in ‘battle of the
sexes’ games. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) deﬁned ‘risk-dominant equilibrium’, and in the game
shown above the equilibrium (A, A) is the risk-dominant equilibrium if ab, and the
equilibrium (B, B) is the risk-dominant equilibrium if ab.
1 Intuitively, (A, A) is the
risk-dominant equilibrium if player 2 is more strongly attracted to the equilibrium (A, A) than
player 1 is to (B, B).
In the last section, we will examine the case of local interaction, which was introduced in
Ellison (1993). We can see that in local interaction games with two populations, not only is the
convergence to the long run equilibrium much faster, but that only the ‘Darwinian property’
on the deterministic dynamics is enough to guarantee that the risk-dominant equilibrium is the
long run equilibrium.
I. Modeling
We will use basically the same model as Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993), except for that
there are two populations, row players (player 1) and column players (player 2). Each
population has N players. The game will be played in discrete times, t1, 2, 3, …. In each
period every player will choose the strategy she will use and be paired with another randomly
chosen player from the other population, and the two players will get the payo#s decided by
the strategies they already chose.
We will look at 22 games and the basic payo# table of the games is as we described in
the introduction.
The scenario here is that while both populations of players want to coordinate, player 2
prefers equilibrium EA in which both players play strategy A, and player 1 prefers equilibrium
EB in which both players play strategy B. These kinds of games are known by the name ‘battle
of the sexes’.
Let z1 denote the number of player 1’s who are playing strategy A, and let z2 denote the
1 Actually, what Harsanyi and Selten deﬁned was that equilibrium (A, A) ‘risk dominates’ equilibrium (B, B) if





A 1, a 0, 0
B 0, 0 b, 1
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,.number of player 2’s who are playing A. Then, the expected payo# of a player i from playing
strategy s when zj of player j’s are playing A, which we will denote as p
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As in Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993), we will assume that the players are myopic and
choose the best response against the distribution of the other player’s strategy in the previous










































j)), ij, for i1, 2.
We will assume that the ‘Darwinian’ property is satisﬁed by the deterministic dynamics
throughout the rest of this paper.
Another thing to note here is that the Darwinian property (D) allows inertia in
adjustment. This means that all the players may not immediately change to the best response,
even though the population is moving in that direction by the assumption of the Darwinian
property (D). Like the Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993) model, this inertia helps to justify
the myopic actions of players.
As in Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993), we assume that players do not always choose the
best response, but they experiment or mutate with a small probability 2+, and randomly choose
A or B with the probability, +0 respectively. This probability to experiment, 2+, is same for
all the players and independent across the players and the populations.
Let’s reintroduce Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993)’s formal deﬁnition of the long run
equilibria.
First, deﬁne the transition probability as
pijklProb(z
t1(k, l)z





2), 0i, j, k, lN, and i, j, k, l are
integers.
P[pijkl] is a Markov matrix and due to the possibility of mutations all elements in the
matrix P are strictly positive.
The stationary distribution m is mPm, where 	{sR
2N2sij0f o ri, j0, 1, …,
N and Sijsij1}.
This m exists uniquely satisfying stability and ergodicity.
2
Deﬁnition: The long run equilibria are the set of states {z(i, j)m* ij0, m*} where
m* is the limit distribution deﬁned by m*lim+
0m(+).
Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993) proved the existence of the long run equilibrium in the
single homogeneous population case. Even though there are two populations in our model, it
is basically the same because there are still only a ﬁnite number of possible states as the
2 Look at Fudenberg and Levine (1998) Chapter 5 for more about this.
2003] I=: ADC< GJC :FJ>A>7G>JB >C 6 <6B: D; “76IIA: D; I=: H:M:H” ,/numbers of players and strategies are ﬁnite. Therefore, we omit the proof on the existence of
the long run equilibrium.
Theorem (Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993)): The limit distribution m* exists and is
unique.
Once we know the existence of the long run equilibrium, the next question would be how
to ﬁnd it. For this purpose we will use the radius and coradius concepts of Ellison (2000) in
the next section.
II. Long Run Equilibria in the Battle of Sexes Game
Before we apply the radius and coradius concepts and ﬁnd the long run equilibrium of the
game, we need to introduce some notations. First, we need to deﬁne z* i,( i1, 2) as the smallest




B(z z* i), where ij. In the game we are

















Obviously, there can be three restpoints of the underlying deterministic paths, (z1, z2)
(0, 0), (z1, z2)(N, N), and (z1, z2)(z z* 1, z z* 2). These are the only possible states that can be the
long run equilibrium.
Here, we will eliminate the possibility that (z z* 1, z z* 2) can be a long run equilibrium by
assuming that it cannot be achieved by fractions of players playing each pure strategy. Then,
we have two candidates for the long run equilibrium, (z1, z2)(0, 0) and (z1, z2)(N, N).
Now let’s call the set of states from which the deterministic paths go to EB (where (z1, z2)
(0, 0)) as ‘the basin of attraction of EB’ and denote it by BB. A similar deﬁnition applies to
the basin of attraction of EA (where (z1, z2)(N, N)) and notation BA.
As we mentioned at the end of the previous section, Ellison (2000) proved that if the
radius of Es is greater than the coradius of Es, then the long run equilibrium of the game
belongs to Es.
We will not repeat the formal deﬁnition of radius and coradius here,
3 but roughly
speaking, the “radius of Bs” is the least number of mutations necessary to leave Bs when play
begins in Es, and the “coradius of Bs” is the least number of mutations necessary to reach Bs
when play begins in a state from which the largest number of mutations are needed to reach
Bs.
Therefore, in practice we can ﬁnd the long run equilibrium by comparing the numbers of
mutations to leave and enter each basin of attraction.
In our case of “battle of the sexes”, this is as simple as ﬁguring out how many mutations
will be needed for the state to change from EA to BB and from EB to BA.
Clearly, the reason why it is so simple is that all states belong to either BA or BB. Therefore,
on the radius side, once the play leaves BA, it is automatically in BB. On the coradius side, once
the play begins in BB, one option that is always available is to reach EB following the
deterministic path, then enter BA from EB. As a result, the coradius of BA cannot be bigger than
the number of mutations needed from EB to BA, while clearly it cannot be smaller.
3 For the formal deﬁnitions of radius and coradius, see page 23 and 24 of Ellison (2000).
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,0Now, let’s look at this game using ﬁgure 1 (a). The states can be denoted in a 2
-dimensional diagram and the directions of the deterministic paths will be like the arrows in
ﬁgure 1 (a). When z2z* 2, B is the best response for player 1 and z1 decreases. On the other
hand, when z2z* 2, z1 increases. In the same way, we can see that the direction of the
movement of z2 depends on the comparison of z1 and z* 1.
Before we look at the battle of the sexes game, let’s see the case where the Darwinian
property is strong enough to predict the long run equilibrium.
F><.1( a )
F><.1( b )
2003] I=: ADC< GJC :FJ>A>7G>JB >C 6 <6B: D; “76IIA: D; I=: H:M:H” ,1Proposition 1: In a game with (a1)(b1)0, for any dynamics with the Darwinian
property EA is the long run equilibrium if z* 1z* 2min{Nz* 1, Nz* 2}, and EB is the long run
equilibrium if (Nz* 11)(Nz* 21)min{z* 1, z* 2}.
The proof is trivial once we realize that z* 1z* 2 is the most number of mutations needed for
the state to change from EB to one in BA, while min{Nz* 1, Nz* 2} is the least number of
mutations needed for the state to change from EA to one in BB. We can see this in ﬁgure 2.
Now let’s go back to battle of the sexes games, where (a1)(b1)0. In general, it is
impossible to ﬁgure out the long run equilibrium in battle of the sexes games only with the
assumption of Darwinian property (D) and the reasons are as follows.
In ﬁgure 1 (a), (b) we can see why di#erent dynamics would lead to di#erent long run
equilibria in games with two populations of players, unlike games with a single population as
in Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993) where any dynamics with the Darwinian property (D)
always lead to the risk-dominant equilibrium in the long run.
In the single population case, all states can be denoted on a line and the sizes of the basins
of attraction can be simply measured and compared by their lengths. Therefore, we can easily
see that the restpoint with the bigger basin of attraction would be the long run equilibrium. In
contrast, here the size of the basin of attraction depends on the adjustment speed of each
population, and in this two dimensional diagram we have no clear standard in comparing the
sizes of the basins of attraction. For example, in ﬁgure 1 (a) we cannot see an obvious way to
say whether BB is bigger than BA or the other way around.
Furthermore, if one looks at ﬁgure 1 (b), one will notice that a simple comparison of the
sizes of BA and BB is not enough to ﬁnd the long run equilibria. Even though BA seems bigger
than BB, the deterministic path can make it very easy to get out of BA(i.e. without many
mutations), while it may need more mutations to get out of the seemingly smaller basin of
attraction, BB. This is because of the fact that some deterministic paths in BA approach BB as
F><.2
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,2they proceed. Sometimes consecutive small numbers of mutations over several periods may
cost less to exit a basin of attraction than one big number of mutations in just one period. This
possibility makes it more di$cult to analyze the game, because just a simple comparison of the
sizes of the basins of attraction will not be enough in ﬁguring out the long run equilibria.
First, we will see conditions that make one cluster of mutations always need less numbers
of mutations than consecutive clusters of small numbers of mutations. We refer to the
dynamics that satisfy the conditions as dynamics (DA).
Before we deﬁne Dynamics (DA), we want to deﬁne x1z1z* 1 and x2z2z* 2, and x
t
i as






2)z* i. With a little abuse of notation, the deterministic path



































where fi is a function








First, condition (i) means that the Dynamics (DA) satisfy the Darwinian property.
Second, at (ii) ‘fi(xi, xi)fi(xi,
 xi)i fxi
 xi’ means roughly that xi moves faster
when xi is farther away from zero. It can be interpreted that players adjust faster to the best
response when the other population is more concentrated on one strategy, that is, when a
bigger gain in payo# is expected from strategy changes. This is a kind of ‘monotonicity’
assumption because the adjustment speeds are higher when the expected payo# gains from the
adjustment are bigger.
Third, condition (iii) means that the change to the best response happens at a higher
speed when more players have already changed to the best response, provided that the expected
payo# gains from this change are the same. The implication of this condition would be that
players might be slower to change to a new strategy when not many from their population have




















The practical reason we need (DA) is that it has the property which guarantees that a
sequence of mutations over several periods will not reduce the number of mutations needed to
exit any basin of attraction compared with simultaneous mutations in just one period. The next
lemma shows this.



































2k2), k1, k20, at























4 We need this condition mainly for the technical purpose of proving lemma 2. However, we can do without
this condition, if the deterministic dynamics are functions of only the expected payo#s, that is, fi(xi, xi)fi(xi).





































2)). The last two inequalities came from conditions










2 . Therefore, we know that



































































































We can say the same thing for the case where the state changes from BA to one in BB.
What we can see from lemma 1 is that if k1k2 mutations are needed for the state to














2) into BA without following the deterministic path any further. Therefore, the least
number of mutations will be needed for the state to change from EB into BA, if this change
happens in one period rather than over many periods.
Now, we are able to decide the long run equilibria by comparing the adjustment speeds of
two populations. What we are saying in the next proposition is that if the payo#s of the game
we are looking at satisfy ba (i.e. EA is the risk-dominant equilibrium according to Harsanyi
and Selten’s deﬁnition), then unless there exists a big di#erence in adjustment speeds between
the two populations, EA will be the long run equilibrium.
Let fimax{xi0, xi0}{fi(xi, x	i)}, that is, the maximum distance that the state










, and see the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Consider dynamics (DA) satisfying
f1(x1, x2)
f2(x1, x2)
l1, for all (x1, x2) such
that x10, x20, x1	l1x2f1, and
f1(x1, x2)
f2(x1, x2)
l2, for all for all (x1, x2) such that x10,
x20, x1	l2(x2	f2). Then, there exists a unique long run equilibrium in games where ba,
and the unique long run equilibrium is the risk-dominant equilibrium, EA.
Proof: From lemma 1 it is obvious that comparing the minimum mutations needed for the
state to change from EB to a state in BA and those from EA to a state in BB would be enough
to ﬁnd the long run equilibrium. The state will certainly change from EB to one in BA, if there
occur z* 1 mutations in population 1 and z* 2 mutations in population 2. The shaded area in ﬁgure
3 denotes the set of states that can be reached from EA with no more than z* 1z* 2 mutations. The
slope of the dotted line in the area x10, x20i sl1. Let’s limit our consideration to the right
side of the dotted line, in other words, (x1, x2)’s such that x10, x20, x1	l1x2f1. Here,
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H -*the slope of the deterministic path from these points would be
f1(x1, x2)
f2(x1, x2)
which is the ratio
of two adjustment speeds of the players. If it is
f1(x1, x2)
f2(x1, x2)
l1, as you can see from ﬁgure 3,
the deterministic path from any state in the shaded area would remain on the right side of the
dotted-line and will ultimately end up in the area where x1, x20 and go back to EA. The same
logic can be applied to the deterministic paths from points where x10, x20, x1l2
(x2f2), and as a result, all the states in the shaded area where x10, x20, also belong to BA.
Therefore, it takes more than z* 1z* 2 mutations for the state to change from EA to a state in BB,
while at most z* 1z* 2 mutations would be enough for the state to change from EB to a state in
BA. As a result, the risk-dominant equilibrium EA is the long run equilibrium. Q.E.D.
The reason that fi(i1, 2) was introduced is that the deterministic path may lead the state
to change from the area x10, x20t ox10, x20, and vice versa. Then, it would be di$cult
to predict where the state will ﬁnally end up, in BA or BB. fi(i1, 2) were introduced so that
we can exclude this possibility. This would not weaken proposition 2 very much if there is
considerable inertia and only very small portions of the populations change their strategies in
each period, that is, if fi(i1, 2) is small.
One thing to notice here is that proposition 2 is a su$cient condition for EA to be the long
run equilibrium.
To get some sense of this proposition let’s look at a numerical example. Let’s assume that
the population is very large and the inertia is big so that fi(i1, 2) is trivially small.
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is the rate of the two populations’ adjustment speeds, the result
means that for EB to be the long run equilibrium there has to be quite a di#erence in the
adjustment speeds between the two populations.
Remark: One thing that should be mentioned here is that Young (1993) also pointed out
that the risk-dominant equilibrium will be the long run equilibrium in two-population games.
However, Young employed an assumption that the players will remember only randomly
chosen K periods out of the most recent N periods. (KN) This assumption that the players
may remember only the remote past without remembering the most recent past trivializes the
analysis in the following sense.
Let’s assume that in ﬁgure 3 the game was at EA at ﬁrst, then Nz* 21 number of player
2’s mutate and choose Bf or one period. Of course, given that all player 1’s are playing A,
player 2’s will go back to play A in the following periods. However, if all player 1’s only
remember the period when many of player 2’s played B, without noticing the fact that they
went back to play A, all player 1’s will change to play Br egardless of what player 2’s are
actually doing at the moment. If more than Nz* 11 player 1’s have changed to play Ba nd
player 2 notices this change, then player 2 will begin to play Bu ntil everybody will play (B,B).
Therefore, Nz* 21 mutations are enough to make the state change from EA to EB, while for
the same reason z* 1 mutations are enough for the change from EB to EA. As a result, the
risk-dominant equilibrium EA will be the long run equilibrium.
Even though it is a very clear cut result, one can see that this selective memory assumption
totally trivializes the analysis of the areas where x10, x20o rx10, x20.
Therefore, even though Young got a similar result as proposition 2 with di#erent
assumptions, analyzing the game without his speciﬁc memory system, as we did in this paper,
is meaningful, especially in the sense that we can get some insight into how the characteristics
of the deterministic path a#ect the long run equilibrium, not to mention the fact that one may
feel it is more realistic.
III. Local Interaction
Here we will again consider the ‘battle of the sexes’ games with N players in each population,
but this time we will assume that the players will be matched only locally.
Let’s assume that players of each population are arrayed in a circle, as in the model in
Ellison (1993), and that the two circles are facing each other and each player is playing only
with her T nearest counterparts with equal probability,
1
T, for each of them.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H -,population 1 A A A A A A A
 
population 2 A A A A A A A
(T3)
Let w1 be the minimum number of A’s played among T nearest players in population 1 in
order to make A the best response for player 2. Also deﬁne w2 as the minimum number of B’s
played among T nearest players in population 2 in order to make Bt he best response for player
1. Clearly, w is are dependent on the payo#s a, b, and when a, b1, obviously w1, w2 1
2
T if
T is even, and w1, w2 1
2
(T1) if T is odd. In the case when a4, b2, and T4, it would
be w11a n dw22.
Now, we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3: In a local interaction game where N is big enough relative to T, EA will be
the long run equilibrium if w1w2, and EB will be the long run equilibrium if w1w2.
5
Proof: (1) We want to show that if w1w2, for any state there is always a way to reach
(N, N)(EA) with at most w1(Tw2) mutations needed. Consider the state where all the
players are playing B. If there occurs a situation where a cluster of neighboring players choose
strategy A such as w1 of player 1’s and Tw2 of player 2’s, the deterministic path will go to
EA. This can be shown because w1 number of player 1’s playing A will make Tw11 adjacent
player 2’s choose A, and because from the assumption w1w2 it is Tw11Tw2,w ec a n
see that the number of player 2’s choosing A will increase. In the same way, (Tw2) number
of player 2’s who are playing A will make w21 player 1’s choose A, and as w1w21, the
number of player 1’s playing A will increase. Then, the increased number of players who play
A will make more players choose A, and this will keep going on until EA is reached.
(2) The rest of the proof is the same as Theorem 1 (a) of Ellison (1993).Q.E.D.
One can see that it can be w1w2, only when ba,a n dw1w2, only when ba. Since EA
is the risk-dominant equilibrium when ba, and EB is the risk-dominant equilibrium when
ba, proposition 3 in essence predicts that the risk-dominant equilibrium will be the long run
equilibrium.
Clearly, one property of the local interaction model is that the convergence time is much
shorter than in the basic model.
However, another good thing about the proposition is that the Darwinian property (D)
is the only restriction needed on the deterministic dynamics.
The fact that we need much fewer restrictions on the dynamics here compared with the
case in section 2 can be understood as follows. In the local interaction model of Ellison (1993)
with a single homogeneous population, the Darwinian property was enough to make the
risk-dominant equilibrium the long run equilibrium, and there were two reasons for this. First,
inside each small neighborhood the risk-dominant equilibrium will be chosen for the same
reason as Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993). Second, a cluster of players who choose the
risk-dominant strategy keeps making the nearby players choose the same strategy. Even
5 In the case where w1w2, there are many equilibria other than EB, EA, and it is di$cult to see what will
happen.
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actually the second one was enough to make the risk-dominant equilibrium the long run
equilibrium.
In this two population case the ﬁrst reason does not hold any more, because, as we saw in
the previous section, the Darwinian property is not strong enough to select the risk-dominant
equilibrium as the long run equilibrium. However, the second reason still holds, because the
local interaction model here is basically the same as that in Ellison, even though in this model
we have two populations of players arrayed in circles rather than one as in Ellison. Therefore,
the Darwinian property should be enough to single out the risk-dominant equilibrium as the
long run equilibrium in this case of local interaction.
We can also easily see that for the same reason that the number of players who play A
keeps expanding, the number of players who play Bk eeps shrinking when w1w2.
Moreover, we can see that there would be many equilibrium states if w1w2. In this case
there are many states where the clusters of players who play A and those of players who play
Bn either expand nor shrink, but coexist while maintaining a kind of stalemate.
However, if the payo#s are asymmetric and ab, then we can always ﬁnd T large enough
to make w1w2, and the risk-dominant equilibrium will be the long run equilibrium by
proposition 3.
Following is an example, when T3, w12, and w21.
Each of the A’s and B’s denotes a player who plays that strategy, and a bold character
denotes the player who will change strategy in the next period.
t1
population 1 A A A BB AA
 
population 2 A A A B A AA
t2
population 1 A ABBBA A
 
population 2 A A A BBAA
It can be easily seen that once Bi s used by three neighboring players, it will be spread to
the entire population via the domino-e#ect.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the nice result of Kandori,Mailath, and Rob (1993) can
be extended to two population cases with some restrictions, including the condition that we
called the dynamics DA. The long run equilibrium would be the risk-dominant equilibrium.
In addition, we have shown that in the case of local interaction, the long run equilibrium
will be again the risk dominant equilibrium as long as only the Darwinian property is satisﬁed.
Also, we could see that the speed of adjustment for each population is important in
deciding the long run equilibrium in these two population cases, unlike the one population
cases.
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